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Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question. Hence all parties are obliged to
borrow, in their daily controversies, the ideas, and even the language,
peculiar to judicial proceedings .... The language of the law thus becomes,
in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the spirit of the law, which is produced
in the schools and courts of justice, gradually penetrates beyond their
walls into the bosom of society, where it descends to the lowest classes, so
that at last the whole people contract the habits and the tastes of the
judicial magistrate.
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What happens when the language
of the law becomes a vulgar
tongue? What happens, more
particularly, when parties to
bioethical discourse are obliged to
borrow in their daily controversies,
the ideas, and even the language,
peculiar to judicial proceedings?
How suited are the habits, taste,
and language of the judicial
magistrate to the political, and
more particularly, the bioethical,
questions of our time?

We ask these questions because, as the
incomparable Tocqueville foresaw,
Americans today truly do resolve political
- and moral - questions into judicial
questions. As Abraham Lincoln hoped,
the Constitution "has become the political
religion of the nation." Many Americans
now "take for granted that the
Constitution embodies moral as well as
legal rules." We revere the Supreme Court
as·the great arbiter of American moral life,
as performing a "prophetic function," as
expressing what "we stand for as a
people." Trial courts, "L.A. Law" wants to
teach us, are forums for the apotheosis of
social and moral reasoning. The legalist
error proliferates that "moral rights
[necessarily] represent claims that ought
to be made in legal rights, that ought to
be protected and enforced by law."
Further, bioethical issues have been
framed for public discussion in legal
terms in cases from Quinlan to Cruzan,
in the tribulations and trials of Baby Doe
and Baby M., in the constitutional
principles of Roe v. Wade, in legislative
reforms of law at the end of life, in
referenda in Washington, California and
Oregon, in the laws travails with Jack
Kevorkian. Finally, the spirit of the law
has penetrated into the bosom of
bioethics because it has penetrated into
the bosom of society generally:
bioethicists partake of the habits and
tastes of their time and place, and those
habits and tastes are in no small part
those of the judicial magistrate.
I will argue that the language of the
law has enriched bioethical discourse.
Law has done so by generating vivid and
pressing instantiations of bioethical
issues, by scrutinizing them - in part in moral terms, and by proffering means
of resolving them. It has contributed
vocabulary and concepts to bioethical
discourse and proffered ways of putting
those words and ideas into practice. But
the law's gifts to bioethical discourse and
to effectuating that discourse should be
cautiously received. For the law has goals
that go beyond the immediate problems
of bioethics, and those goals peculiarly
shape the moral terms the law employs
and specially alter the direction legal
discourse takes. Furthermore, the law has
limits that arise from its special social
purpose, and those limits crimp the
usefulness of law's language as a vehicle
for bioethical discourse.
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Law is essentially a device for social
regulation. It is the means by which
society through its government seeks to
establish a framework for human
interactions. This framework helps set
minimum standards for human behavior
(criminal law and tort law exemplify this
function), helps establish and support the
institutions and practices people use in
organizing their relations with each other
(this is what contract and commercial
law, for instance, do), and helps people
resolve their disputes (which is a primary
function of civil courts). In this century,
the law has broadened that framework by
providing some minimum assurances of
human well-being (what we call the
welfare state).
Laws calling as a device for social
regulation is its boon and bane as a
language of bioethics. As boon, laws
attractions are two. First, it provides a
highly developed, conceptually fertile,
analogically abundant, professionally
precise, systematically disciplined
language for thinking about bioethical
issues, a rich language that Oliver
Wendell Holmes called "the witness and
external deposit of our moral life."
Second, law provides a tool not just for
talk, but for action. As bane, laws
disadvantages are also two. First, its
language is often inapt. Second, it
regularly fails to achieve its desired effect,
and sometimes seems to have hardly any
effect at all.

The language of the

lAW

We tum now to laws first attraction as
a language for bioethical discourse.
Because law has centuries of experience
with social regulation, it offers a highly
articulated method and language for
analyzing social problems. That method,
in America, is the common-law process:
Courts build legal principles incrementally,
by evaluating one case at a time;
legislatures intermittently respond with
reforms and reconsiderations. One might
think of this as Rawls' reflective
equilibrium in action. It is a method well
suited to a field as new and febrile as
bioethics, since it brings to bear longnurtured principles on emerging
problems. And it is a method particularly
congenial to medicine and applied ethics,
since, like them, it relies in important
ways on cases.
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This almost-dialectical common-law
method has over the last millennium
elaborated a language of social regulation.
That language includes a vocabulary not
just of terms, but of conceptual,
organizing ideas. Three sets of ideas form
idioms that particularly influence
bioethical debate and that will repay
attention: laws dispute-resolution
function, its facilitative function, and its
rights discourse.
One of laws oldest aims is to help
people resolve disputes. American law
does so partly through the law of torts.
When one person injures another, the
law may authorize a tort suit. The tort
action provides a way of settling the
dispute between the injurer and the
victim and of restoring the victim to his
prior well-being. By setting the
substantive terms for resolving disputes,
tort law also establishes a standard of
behavior which - one hopes - may
shape conduct so that injuries are
deterred, disputes are forestalled, and,
even, people behave better.
Because the language of torts provides
a convenient pattern for thinking about
those bioethical issues that arise where
one person has injured another, it has
seemed a promising response where
doctors abuse their power over patients.
Building on tort doctrines (like the
principle that people may not be touched
unless they have given their consent),
courts have developed a principle of
informed consent. This principle serves
three bioethical goals: to help resolve
disputes over injuries caused by a doctors
failure to inform a patient adequately; to
recompense - however crudely - the
injured patient; and - more ambitiously
- to improve the way doctors treat
patients.
The law tries to conduce to good not
just through tort law, but also through
what I call the facilitative function: by,
that is, lending people the laws authority
to use in organizing their relations with
each other. A familiar example of this
function is the law of contracts, which
allows people to reach whatever
agreements about their affairs they desire,
and to deploy the laws power to make
those agreements binding and thus

predictable and reliable. The facilitative
function also lets people recruit the laws
force to give binding effect to their
personal preferences. Two common
examples of this are the will and the
power of attorney, which permit people
to dispose of their property as they wish
or to allocate that power to someone else.
As bioethics began to hunt for ways of
enhancing the power of patients, the
idiom of the facilitative function
attractively presented itself. Some people
have, for example, sought to reform the
relationship between doctors and patients
by treating it in contractual terms. (This
effort has foundered because of a classic
problem with contract law: contracts tend
to ratify pre-existing differences in
power.) More successful have been
analogies to the law of wills and the law
of agency (the law authorizing powers of
attorney). Out of those analogies have
arisen the living will and the durable
power of attorney, devices that extend the
authority of patients to control their
medical treatment when they can no
longer think and act for themselves.
Finally, as Benjamin N. Cardozo said,
'The great ideals of liberty and equality
are preserved against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, the scorn and derision of
those who have no patience with general
principles, by enshrining them in
constitutions . . . ." This process evokes
the language of rights, a language that has
achieved a potence and preeminence in
the United States unmatched anywhere in
the world. That language is woefully
muddled by our tendency to conflate
moral rights, statutory rights, and
constitutional rights. But constitutional
rights are undoubtedly the trump cards of
our legal system. Once recognized, they
massively prevail against statutes that
infringe on them. What is more, they
have not just a legal, but also a luminous
social and moral, authority.
The laws rights discourse has seemed
delightfully suited to that engine of
bioethical thought, the doctrine of
autonomy. Thus proponents of one set of
bioethical positions have enlisted the
doctrine of constitutional rights with
overwhelming effect in the law of
reproduction generally and abortion
specifically. Because the debate over that
law was phrased in rights terms, its

language, tone, content, and result have
been transformed. And proponents of
another position have similarly labored,
with some profit, to transpose the
discourse about euthanasia into a debate
over a - constitutional - right to die.
In America, then, the language of the
law lies easy on the tongue. It abounds in
productive principles and illuminating
analogies. It provides familiar and
powerful tools for analyzing many social
problems, including many bioethical
issues. And to a notable extent, bioethical
discourse has been phrased in legal
terms, has been conducted in courts and
legislatures, and has won legal reforms.
Nevertheless, alluring as the laws
language is, it has drawbacks and limits
that are not always perceived or
understood. Like the attractions of that
language, these drawbacks arise from
laws role as a means of social regulation.
More concretely, the laws language is
shaped specifically for a system with a
particular aim - social regulation. That
aim itself is a limited one - to shape and
not to supplant social practices and
institutions. And the law is a blunt chisel
even for that task.
First, the idioms of the law are often
less apt than they might appear. They
have arisen in response to needs for social
regulation; but the systemic imperatives
that shape the law are sometimes a poor
pattern for bioethical discourse. For
example, the law of torts is centrally a
way of compensating victims of an injury.
But bioethicists have wanted the law of
informed consent not just to remedy
specific failures to inform patients, but to
fundamentally reform the relationship
between doctors and patients. However,
tort law ill suits this ambitious goal.
For one thing, the language of torts is
the language of wrongs. That language
states only minimum duties; it is not the
language of aspiration. A doctor may
obey it through quite mechanical and
sadly unsatisfactory routines that mock
the dialogue bioethicists imagine for
doctors and patients. Furthermore, the
law penalizes the breach of even those
minimal duties only sporadically - when
a patient has actually been injured by that
breach, when the injury is great enough
to justify the expense of a suit, and when
the patient realizes all this and is willing
to sue.

More broadly, not just torts law, but
the law generally, is inept at shaping
relationships - particularly relationships
that are instant with intimacy. The field
that tries most directly to do so - family
law - is perhaps the sorriest of laws
enterprises. As James Fitzjames Stephen
wrote, "To try to regulate the internal
affairs of a family, the relations of love or
friendship, or many other things of the
same sort, by law or by the coercion of
public opinion, is like trying to pull an
eyelash out of a mans eye with a pair of
tongs. They may put out the eye, but
they will never get hold of the eyelash."
Familial affairs involve relations between
people who deal with each other in
private on a personal basis concerning
intimately personal questions and
consulting personal values that are
passionately felt. In such affairs, it is hard
for law to learn what is going on in the
relationship, to write rules that will fit
each relationship, to supervise it, and to
induce people to follow those rules and
cooperate with that supervision.
The relationship between doctor and
patient is not always all that it might be,
and it is sometimes more bureaucratic
than personal. But it can partake, and its
members often want it to partake, of
those qualities that make it inapt for the
law's regime. Thus trying to organize that
relationship through tort law may be an
example of what Judith Shklar
disparagingly calls "the structuring of all
possible human relations into the form of
claims and counterclaims under
established rules."
A second drawback of analyzing
bioethical problems in legal terms is that
law is a system of social regulation, a
system whose parts should mesh into
what Holmes called "a thoroughly
connected system," a (reasonably)
coherent body of precedent and
principle. Jurists have worried for
centuries that changing one area of law
will unexpectedly alter another. Such
concerns help explain, for instance, the
Supreme Courts decision in Cruzan

LAW.ii
e~~entially a
device for ~ocial
re~ulation.
It is the means by which
society through its
government seeks to
establish a framework
for human interactions.

(Cruzan v. Director; Missouri Department
of Health , 497 US 261 [1990]), in which
the Court was asked to declare a
constitutional right to die. The Court
might have done so except for Roe v.
Wade, which established a right to an
abortion. The Court has long agonized
over Roe, and several Justices regret ever
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embogging themselves in the jurisprudential and political quagmire of abortion
and its questions of constitutional
interpretation and federalism . Whatever
the moral appeal of the Cruzans' right-todie argument, accepting it would have
seemed to revivify Roe and its
expansionist view of constitutional
analysis and judicial power. Thus even a
Justice who liked much in the Cruzans'
argument might have rejected it for fear
of its systemic implications.
This point can be put somewhat
differently Every judicial opinion looks
forward as well as backward; every
opinion is both based on precedent and
itself becomes precedent. Yet a court
cannot easily anticipate what kind of
precedent an opinion will become, for the
cases and arguments it will govern are
cloaked in the mists of the future. The
resulting fear of the unforeseen
consequences of each legal precedent is
one reason slippery-slope arguments are
so common and so telling in law.
Anticipating consequences is
particularly urgent where, as in Cruzan
and Roe, "privacy" rights are at stake. To
maintain the vigor of those rights, the
Court has made it structurally arduous to
justify a statute that conflicts with them.
Yet this has introduced a crucial and
almost perverse rigidity in the law: The
Court hesitates to define interests as
"rights" because that decisions consequences
are so severe. The stronger the doctrine of
rights, then, the more reluctant the Court
must be to deploy it. Thus the majority in
Cruzan declined to find a "right to die" in
the Constitution partly for fear of what
Cardozo called the "tendency of a
principle to extend itself to the limits of
its logic."
Seen in this light, Cruzan is not hard
to understand. The Court faced several
kinds of systemic pressure to cabin the
privacy rights it had announced in Roe,
and it dreaded the slippery slope it might
slide down. In addition, it faced a
substantive question - euthanasia whose slopes were notoriously slippery,
whose contours had changed with
chastening speed, and whose future
dimensions were disturbingly murky Thus,
however the Justices may have assessed the
ethical merits of the Cruzans' position,
whatever their views of good public policy;
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and however seductive the idiom of rights,
they faced strong systemic reasons not to
create a right to die.
This leads us to a third limitation of
thinking about bioethical problems in
legal terms. Law is a system of social
regulation, and social regulation is the art
of the possible and the necessary Out of
a sense of what is normatively desirable
and practically possible, American law
seeks only to plan a bare framework for
society, and not a complete blueprint for
it. Our common law does not - unlike
civil law - even aspire itself to be a
complete system. Thus there are often
gaps in legal doctrine where legal
institutions have not fully dealt with an
issue.
One such limitation arises from the
fact that our judicial system is primarily
driven by litigants. Cases they do not
bring cannot be adjudicated. Arguments
they do not make will not be heard.
Another limitation arises from the fact
that law relies on precedent. Propositions
for which there is no precedent will have
trouble making their way into law. One
example of this "incompleteness" problem
appears in the law of rights. That law has
historically flourished in one
paradigmatic situation - where a single
individual confronts the state. Virtually all
rights-thinking in American law is
organized around that paradigm. "In such
conflicts," as I once wrote, "we are
predisposed to favor the person, out of
respect for his moral autonomy and
human dignity That predisposition also
rests on our assumption that the state can
bear any risks of an incorrect decision
better than the individual can." But in
bioethics the conflict often is not between
one person and the state, but between
two people, each with a claim against the
other and each with a rights claim against
the state. Our legal rights doctrine tells us
little about how to make such choices
because those are not situations the law
was designed to cope with.
Surrogate-mother contracts exemplify
this problem. In the Baby M case, did
Mr. Stern have a constitutional right to
father a child in this way? Did Mrs.
Whitehead have a constitutional right to
raise Melissa, the child she had borne?
Did Melissa have a constitutional right to
a decision made in her best interests? To
be reared by her natural mother? To stay
in touch with both her natural parents?

Little in our crude and crabbed doctrine
of constitutional rights helps answer
those questions.
I have observed that laws language can
enrich bioethics' discussion of the moral
and public-policy issues that subject
treats. Yet I suggested that courts and
legislatures speak a language shaped by
the special exigencies of a legal system of
social regulation, a language that is easily
misunderstood by an unwary public and
that fits uneasily with the language of
bioethical reflection. In particular, I
discussed that part of the laws language
closest to the mainsprings of bioethical
discourse - the laws rights talk. I
suggested that rights talk is narrow
enough to begin with. John Ladd, for
instance, profitably contrasts that talk
with a broader discourse, the language of
"responsibility" In bioethics, "a
responsible decision may require
consideration of such different things as
risks and benefits, other relationships,
concerns, needs and abilities of persons
affected by and affecting the decision. In
addition, in order to make responsible
decisions it is usually necessary to
'weight' a number of factors against each
other; the final decision often requires
what we generally call 'judgment."' He
contrasts rights talk: "Decisions based on
rights, on the other hand, are quite
different. They do not permit taking into
account most of the considerations
mentioned, and they do not involve the
same kind of weighing, deliberation,
judgment, etc., that is called for in cases
of responsibility."
But rights talk in the law is
importantly more limited even than in
ethics, for the apparent similarity of the
laws rights talk and bioethics' autonomy
principle is misleading. Bioethics can
describe a principle of autonomy
complex and modulated enough to
assimilate the full range of relevant moral
considerations. But the law is constrained
by its function as an agency of social
regulation. It must find authority in legal
precedent, fit its rights principles into a
demanding context, and articulate rights
doctrines that can be translated into the
day-to-day work of courts, lawyers, and
citizens. Such factors are inevitable in any

system of law. However, they corrode the
wide-ranging, subtle, and complex
principles necessary to a system of ethics.
And they suggest one reason that some
bioethical versions of the autonomy
principle will not readily be transformed
into law.

Political and Judicial

QU[mom

This leads us to law's second advantage
as a language of bioethical discourse.
Perhaps law's most beguiling aspect is
that it is not just talk. It is also a way of
actively, directly trying to change the
world. It is not the only way, nor always
the best way, but it has conspicuous
attractions.
The first such attraction is that law
embodies an already established
enforcement structure. Further, that
structure is backed, ultimately, by
society's fiercest instruments of coercion.
For instance, the fear of criminal
prosecution even today influences - and
some say, should influence - decisions
about terminating medical treatment.
And opponents of abortion precisely
want to use the criminal law to prevent
abortions.
But law is not just a structure of
regulation backed by force. Law also
enjoys social and moral authority. Laws
are often obeyed because people believe
they should obey the law. And people are
subtly but truly influenced by the law's
expressive capacity (which exploits the
law's power to impart ideas through
words and symbols) and by the social
force (the force of familiarity, custom, and
legitimacy) acquired by institutions the
law supports. This is, for instance, one
defense of the law of informed consent:
even though recalcitrant doctors may
evade it, it symbolizes society's aspirations
for medicine. That symbol, over time,
supported by an emerging practice, and
taken with other legal and social
measures, may gradually prevail in the
minds and methods of doctors.
The law is an appealing device for
change for yet another reason - there
are so many points of access to it. The
law can be reached through the
instruments of democracy and through
litigation, all means available (in
principle) to anyone. This helps explain
why people trying to challenge, for

instance, the institutional authority of
medicine and the individual power of
doctors have sought to speak in the voice
of the law.
Despite these attractions, almost all
laymen and too many lawyers sadly overestimate the law's precision and reach.
Why does law so often fail to translate
hopes into reality? Once again, it is
crucial that law is a system of social
regulation. Bioethical reflection can
analyze each case meticulously to seek
the right result for that case. But a system
of social regulation cannot trust each
decision-maker to make each case right.
Nor can it tolerate discretion's
inconsistency and unpredictability.
Further, a wisely considered and carefully
formulated rule may produce the right
result in more cases than the ad hoc
efforts of individual decision-makers. For
all these reasons, justice may require that
an agency of social regulation substitute
rules for discretion. Further,
considerations of efficiency may lead to
the same result. As Alfred North
Whitehead wonderfully wrote,

It is a profoundly erroneous truism,
repeated by copy-books and by eminent
people when they are making speeches,
that we should cultivate the habit of
thinking about what we are doing. The
precise opposite is the case. Civilization
advances by extending the number of
important operations which we can
perfarm without thinking about them.
Operations of thought are like cavalry
charges in a battle - they are strictly
limited in number, they require fresh
horses, and must only be made at
decisive moments.
But of course, when you adopt a rule,
you risk diminishing the chance of doing
exact justice in every case, since rules by
their nature sweep many somewhat
diverse cases into a single category. This is
the problem the Missouri legislature faced
in the statute tested in Cruzan. That
statute's rule set a high standard of
evidence for terminating treatment. The
legislature presumably calculated that
making such decisions discretionary was
likelier to produce more "errors" than the
rule it adopted. Similarly, some states
have concluded that a rule prohibiting

appeal in~ device
for c~an~e for yet

point~ of acceH to it.
The law can be reached
through the instruments of
democracy and through
litigation, all means available
{in principle} to anyone.
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surrogate-mother contracts will yield
more good results than a series of
discretionary decisions about enforcing
each specific contract. But both rules pay
a cost in wrong decisions, as the facts of
Cruzan suggest.
Rules have another drawback. They
must be so clear and comprehensible that
the people who apply them will
understand them. Yet clarity exacts a cost
in justice. This problem plagues
bioethics. For example, doctors
reasonably complain that tort law's hazy
"reasonable patient" standard tells them
frustratingly little about their duties. Yet
critics who want a doctrine of informed
consent with real bite reasonably
complain that a clearer standard would
leave uncovered the numerous
unforeseen situations which ought to be
covered.
In all these ways, then, the language of
the law must give up something - and
sometimes a great deal - in precision
and in sensitivity because of the contexts
in which law is actually applied. But there
is a further, deeper problem. One of the
great truths about law is that with
unnerving frequency, it fails to achieve
the effects intended for it, and sometimes
quite fails to have any effect at all. Some
of tlue most fascinating modem legal
scholarship reminds lawyers how
removed their talk is from the worlds
ken. That literature reveals that, to the
lawyer's chagrin, businesses resist using
contracts, ranchers do not know what
rules of liability govern damage done by
wandering cattle, suburbanites do not
summon the law to resolve neighborhood
disputes, engaged couples do not know
the law governing how they will own
property when they marry, citizens
repeatedly reject the due process
protections proffered them, and, what is
worse, all these people simply don't
much care what the law says.
The same can be said of many of the
laws recent bioethical reforms. There is
evidence that as few as ten percent of us
have made an advance directive, that only
a quarter of us have signed an organ
donor card (despite the swarms of us
who say we want to be donors), that even
competent patients are not widely
consulted about do-not-resuscitate orders
that doctors have reduced informed
'
consent to one more bureaucratic chore,
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and that plaintiffs rarely win informedconsent suits.
What is going on here? Well, of
course, many things. But central among
them is societys enormous complexity
and the narrow relevance of the law to it.
People are moved by many pressures
beyond those the law creates. They have
their own agendas and, more important,
their own normative systems. The law
writes rules, but the governed - when
they know the rules - often have the
incentives, time, and energy to avoid
them.
Consider advance directives. They
offer an apparently irresistible way of
speaking in one of lifes greatest crises. Yet
people spurn them. People do so because
they have their own lives to lead.
Momentous as the crisis may be, it will
generally not seem urgent until it arrives.
People resist contemplating their own
mortality. They heartily dislike and don't
easily understand legal forms; people find
them obscure and darkly imagine how
they might be misused. For that matter,
people may doubt that they will be used
at all. Further, many people have trouble
envisioning their circumstances years into
the future or how they would respond to
those hypothetical circumstances. And I
suspect that people expect that decisions
about their welfare would in any case fall
to people they trust - to their families.
In short, advance directives were
formulated and promoted by people bioethicists, lawyers, and doctors, for
instance - who know what they want to
do through them and keenly want to do
it. But many of us are not clear about
what we want and about whether getting
it is worth the costs.
While the language of the law may
have penetrated into the bosom of society,
it must still, in quotidian life, compete
with the many other languages that
people speak more comfortably, more
fluently, and with more conviction. These
are languages of religion and morality, of
love and friendship, of pragmatism and
social accommodation, of custom and
compromise. The danger for bioethicists,
then, is believing too deeply that law can
pierce the Babel, can speak with
precision, can be heard.

The Spirit of the

lAW

I have tried to show how laws
function as an agency of social regulation
produces a language that - despite its
uses and attractions - can be an inapt
idiom for bioethical discourse and even
for transforming bioethical principles into
social policy I now, want to propose that
"socio-psychologically," if not logically,
that language may tend to sway us in
undesirable directions. I will suggest two
of them.
let me give a brief example of my first
concern. Every year I ask my (law and
medical) students whether they have any
moral obligation to give blood. They
immediately bristle and tell me that the
law should not require people to make
such donations. I repeat what I have
already told them, that I am not asking
about legal duties, but about moral ones.
They reply that no such obligation should
be imposed on them, whether by law or
any other outside force. When I ask why
those of them who have given blood have
done so, they say that they happen,
purely as an arbitrary matter of personal
preference, to want to do so. like the
subjects of Robert Bellah's Habits of the
Heart, even their "deepest ethical virtues
are justified as matters of personal
preference."
I think this story has many
explanations. The one relevant to our
problem begins with the observation that
law generally conceives of problems in
terms of rights, whether constitutional or
not. This promotes bioethics' own
legalistic tendencies, for "it is hardly an
exaggeration to say that discussions of
medical ethics often amount to little more
than glosses on the rights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness," as Ladd
says. It is often desirable for people to
look on their relations with government
in rights terms. It is sometimes necessary
for people to look on their relations with
other people in those terms. But, as I've
previously written, making rights central
to ones world view carries a danger:

Thinking in terms of rights encourages us
to ask what we may do to free ourselves,
not to bind ourselves. It encourages us to
think about what constrains us from doing
what we want, not what obligates us to do
what we ought. Legal rights are tellingly
different from moral rights in this respect:

When philosophers talk about rights, they
commonly talk about a complex web of
relationships and duties between
individuals; when lawyers talk about
rights, they commonly talk about areas of
liberty to act without interference.
This tendency of rights thinking is
exacerbated in the United States by the
feeling that to assert ones rights is a
virtue, that, as A.I. Melden wrote in Rights
and Persons, "to demand our rights, to
assert ourselves as the moral agents we
are, is to be able to demand that we be
dealt with as members of the community
of human beings." In dealing with the
government, this may often be true.
However, as I've said,

attitudes appropriate to civil rights may
be inappropriate to privacy rights.
Civil rights are rights to participate in
self-government and society. Such
participation is at least a virtue and may
be a duty. But privacy rights are in a
sense the opposite of civil rights they are rights not to be affected by
government and society - and to fore go
their use can be a virtue and even a duty.
One reason rights thinking is so
prevalent in the United States is that in a
self-consciously pluralist and secular
society other sources of value have lost
much of their authority. But this also
aggravates the risks of rights thinking, for
it deprives people of the incentives for
modulating rights claims which a moral
system can supply. My students
vehemently believe that nothing should
bind them to give blood; only their
"arbitrarily" chosen preferences counsel
them to do so. Nothing in rights thinking
requires this kind of response; but in a
world in which the language of the law
has become a vulgar tongue, that
response comes all too readily to the lips.
Another "socio-psychological" peril lies
in abandoning people to their rights.
If doctors and patients meet clad in the
armor of their rights, both of them will
lose as well as gain. As Robert A. Burt has
written: 'The physician who is now
instructed to obey the 'informed consent'
of his patient, no matter how harmful he
feels that action to be for the patient, is
not only permitted but positively
enjoined to separate himself from his
patient, to respect his patients 'autonomy'

by suppressing his own identifications,
his self-confusions, with that patient."
Robert Zussman suggests that such a
separation may be taking place: "While a
number of observers of the medical scene
have argued that patients and patient
advocates may demand rights in response
to the impersonality of relations with
physicians, few have noted that
physicians may also become advocates of
patients rights in response to the
impersonality of their relations with
patients." As Charles L. Bosk writes, "The
dark side of patient autonomy [is] patient
abandonment."
Of course, rights thinking has
achieved its present power in bioethics
exactly because of medicine's long history
of paternalism and because of its long
prospect of increasingly bureaucratic and
impersonal relations between doctor and
patient. The question I raise is about the
costs of responding to these evils in too
legalistic a way. Or, as Grant Gilmore put
it in The Ages of American Law: "The
worse the society, the more law there will
be. In Hell there will be nothing but law,
and due process will be meticulously
observed."

The Vulgar Tongue
In this paper, I have argued that law
offers a rewarding language of social
regulation. But I have also contended that,
as a vehicle for discussing morally
consequential issues like those in
bioethical disputes, that language is
momentously limited and often inapt. Law
is the language of social regulation, and
hence obeys systemic imperatives that are
irrelevant to and even may conflict with
genuine understanding and wise
resolution of moral issues. This is why
Holmes saw himself "as a judge whose first
business is to see that the game is played
according to the rules whether I like them
or not." It is why Cardozo thought the
judge "is not to yield to spasmodic
sentiment, to vague and unregulated
benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion
informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinated to 'the primordial necessity
of order in the social life."'
Of course courts and (much more)
legislatures sometimes speak in moral
terms. But that fact must be understood in
light of laws task as a system of social
regulation: As Holmes said, "The law is full

of phraseology drawn from morals, and by
the mere force of language continually
invites us to pass from one domain to the
other without perceiving it ..
Manifestly, therefore, nothing but
confusion of thought can result from
assuming that the rights of man in a moral
sense are equally rights in the sense of the
Constitution and the law." Crnzan does not
express the Courts belief about whether
Nancy Beth Cruzan should have been
allowed to die. Roe does not state the
Courts view of the desirability of Texas'
abortion statute. The law of informed
consent does not embody any legislatures
whole sense of the ethical duties of doctors
to patients. All this sharply and crucially
limits both the extent to which the
language of the law may safely be
imported into bioethical discourse and to
which bioethical ideas may be effectively
translated into law.
We no doubt must live with the fact
that the law has become, in some measure,
a vulgar tongue, that its spirit has
penetrated into the bosom of society. Yet
we should remember that the laws calling
is to regulate social life, however
awkwardly, and its language reflects that
purpose. That is its strength. But like any
lexicon, laws vocabularies must be
handled cautiously. For its idioms rule us
in ways we do not always grasp or desire,
and they have limits growing out of the
ends for which they were created.
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